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The “Year of the Woman” (1992) and the year of #MeToo (2018) were
landmark years for women in federal congressional elections. Both years also
represent significant milestones for women’s roles as U.S. public company directors. In each of these two years, social context was interconnected with
these political and corporate gender changes. The relevant social context in
2018 is most clearly defined by public revelations of sexual misconduct involving a significant number of men in positions of political and business power.
The relevant social context in 1992 similarly involved specific, highly public
disclosures and allegations of sexual misconduct.
These parallels beg many questions. In particular, one may ponder
whether the correlation between social context and congressional or public
company board elections is coincidence or something more. Apropos of the
current era, those of us who focus on corporate board diversity may wonder
whether looking at the election of women to Congress and corporate boards in
the #MeToo era provides any insights or lessons about female corporate
board representation.
This brief Essay examines and comments on possible gender effects of the
#MeToo movement on public company board composition in relation to the
possible gender effects of the #MeToo movement on the composition of legislative bodies. Although #MeToo has clarified, and perhaps expanded, the salient connections between business issues and women’s issues, those who have
the power to elect corporate directors may not fully recognize this connection
or other factors as unique values of female corporate board participation. Until additional female membership on corporate boards is substantively valued,
swift sustainable changes in the gender makeup of corporate boards may not
be realizable without specific, enforceable legal mandates. Although California’s state legislature has taken a bold step in this direction in the #MeToo era,
it seems unlikely that additional state legislatures will follow its lead. As a
result, the pace of change in corporate board gender composition is likely to
continue to be more evolutionary than revolutionary.
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1 See Emma Hinchliffe et al., 2018 Is the Second ‘Year of the Woman:’ An Oral History of
the Women Who Gave Rise to the First, FORTUNE (Oct. 30, 2018), http://fortune.com/longform/
oral-history-year-of-the-woman-2018-midterm-elections/ [https://perma.cc/L5DX-LDBA]; Sarah
Pruitt, How Anita Hill’s Testimony Made America Cringe—and Change, HISTORY (Sept. 26,
2018), https://www.history.com/news/anita-hill-confirmation-hearings-impact [https://perma.cc/
92B7-LL9C]; Li Zhou, The Striking Parallels Between 1992’s “Year of the Woman” and 2018,
Explained by a Historian, VOX (Nov. 2, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/2/
17983746/year-of-the-woman-1992 [https://perma.cc/275Q-Y9T2] (interview with Georgetown
University professor Michele Swers).
2 Zhou, supra note 1.
3 See CATALYST, WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS 5 (1993).
4 See id.
5 See id. at 7.
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1992 was dubbed the political “Year of the Woman.” The appointment of Clarence Thomas to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1991
after hearings focused on sexual harassment allegations, together with
revelations of Bill Clinton’s extramarital sexual conduct during his
first campaign for U.S. President, have been credited with the extraordinary number of women elected to federal legislative positions
in 1992.1 That year, “[w]hen the ballots were counted, America had
elected a record-breaking four women as senators and 24 women as
representatives to Congress.”2 In 1992, 494 of the boards of directors
of Fortune 500 and Service 500 companies included female directors.3
That number climbed to 526 in 1993, a 6.5% increase.4 This, however,
represented only 721—or 6.2%—of the 11,715 seats on the boards of
directors of those firms.5
2018 was, again, a hallmark year for women in politics. It also
represented a banner year for the U.S. public company boardroom.
Amazingly, the socio-political milieu of 2018 included another U.S.
Supreme Court appointment tinged with allegations of sexual miscon-
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duct6 and a sitting U.S. President with a publicly reported history of
philandering and lechery.7 These and other examples frame the
#MeToo movement,8 which undoubtedly was a factor in both the unprecedented number of women seeking political office in 2018 and a
simultaneous renewed interest in gender diversity on corporate
boards of directors. Perhaps this is not surprising. #MeToo largely emanates from the abuse of gendered power in government and business
firms—the sectors in which congressional and public company director elections occur. Moreover, government and business, especially
public companies (which are largely corporations), are together re-

6 See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Dog Whistles and Beachheads: The Trump Administration, Sexual Violence, and Student Discipline in Education, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303, 338
(2019) (stating that “then-Judge Kavanaugh was accused of sexually harassing and assaulting
multiple teenage girls when he was in high school and college”); Michele Goodwin & Mariah
Lindsay, American Courts and the Sex Blind Spot: Legitimacy and Representation, 87 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2337, 2338 (2019) (noting and describing the testimony of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford
during Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearings); Marla N. Greenstein, Addressing Sexual
Harassment in the Courts, 57 JUDGES’ J. 1, 1 (2018) (mentioning “the additional hearing addressing allegations of attempted sexual assault against Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh”);
Dara E. Purvis, Trump, Gender Rebels, and Masculinities, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 423, 449
(2019) (noting the revelation of “multiple allegations of sexual assault arose from his years in
high school and college” during Justice Kavanaugh’s nomination hearings).
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8 This Essay uses the term “#MeToo movement” in an expansive way to refer to cohesive—and, in some cases, coordinated—responses to recent increased and continuing disclosures
of sexual assault and harassment, especially sexual misconduct in workplaces and in working
relationships. It should be acknowledged, however, that the moniker “Me Too” was actually
coined in the sexual misconduct context more than a decade ago in efforts “to help survivors of
sexual violence, particularly Black women and girls, and other young women of color from low
wealth communities, find pathways to healing.” History & Vision, ME TOO, https://
metoomvmt.org/about/#history [https://perma.cc/6S3M-MTT9]; see also Chicago Tribune,
#MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2018, 8:37 AM) https://
www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html [https://
perma.cc/G6S9-S8AY] (“In 2006, Tarana Burke coined the phrase ‘Me Too’ as a way to help
women who had survived sexual violence. Fast-forward more than 10 years, and the phrase has
been reignited as the slogan of the anti–sexual harassment movement.”).
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7 See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman & Elizabeth G. Porter, Reinvigorating Commonality: Gender and Class Actions, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 895, 905 (2017) (mentioning “rampant and credible
sexual assault allegations against Donald Trump” in the 2016 presidential election); Sally J. Kenney, Toward a Feminist Political Theory of Judging: Neither the Nightmare nor the Noble Dream,
17 NEV. L.J. 549, 553 (2017) (noting “Donald Trump’s propensity toward sexual assault”); Emily
A. Robey-Phillips, Federalism in Campus Sexual Violence: How States Can Protect Their Students When a Trump Administration Will Not, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 373, 391–92 (2018)
(pointing out that “then-candidate Trump’s campaign was nearly derailed when a video of him
bragging about committing sexual assault went viral”); Catherine J. Ross, Assaultive Words and
Constitutional Norms, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 739, 757 (2017) (mentioning “the airing of Donald
Trump’s ‘grab ‘em by the pussy’ remarks” during the 2016 presidential campaign).
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9 E.g., CATALYST, supra note 3, at 1 (“[T]he decisions made in corporate boardrooms
affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of employees and consumers, as well as the performance and policies of other corporations, the ebb and flow of economic activity, the dealings of
the global marketplace and international business strategies.”).
10 See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sex, Trust, and Corporate Boards, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 173 (2007); Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Last Male Bastion: In Search of a
Trojan Horse, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77 (2011); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sarah White,
Wanted: Female Corporate Directors, 29 PACE L. REV. 249 (2009) (reviewing DOUGLAS M.
BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE (2007)); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Women in the Crowd of
Corporate Directors: Following, Walking Alone, and Meaningfully Contributing, 21 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 59 (2014) [hereinafter Heminway, Women in the Crowd].
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sponsible for the fundamental regulation of our economic and social
lives.9
Given these parallels, there may be some value to looking at both
the political and business management reactions to #MeToo, taken together. As a female transactional business lawyer and business law
scholar whose work often intersects with corporate governance, I have
long been interested in board composition from a gender viewpoint.
In my years of law practice, I often sat in client conferences, management meetings, and boardrooms in which I was one of few, if any
other, women. From time to time, my published work has touched on
aspects of the issue of women in corporate management.10 Yet, to
date, I have not explored connections between political and corporate
governance through a gender lens. This Essay preliminarily undertakes that task in the hopes that it will lead to new observations about
the prospects for the increased gender diversity of corporate boards of
directors and additional related research.
Specifically, in this Essay, I am interested in briefly comparing,
contrasting, and reflecting on the possible gender effects of the
#MeToo movement on public company board composition in relation
to the possible gender effects of the #MeToo movement on the composition of legislative bodies. Any actual effects of the #MeToo movement will only be observable and verifiable through an engaged
research agenda comprised of quantitative and qualitative empirical
studies. As a result, this Essay merely promises to scratch the surface—begin a conversation—by identifying salient issues and suggesting possible avenues for further inquiry. Although it must be
acknowledged that empirical and theoretical research on the value of
gender diversity and inclusion on corporate boards is incomplete and

41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 34 Side A

01/29/2020 09:32:14

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\87-5\GWN503.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 5

24-JAN-20

ME, TOO AND #METOO

10:02

1083

mixed,11 this Essay assumes there is value in board diversity and inclusion, including gender diversity and inclusion.12
To achieve these limited objectives, this Essay begins by briefly
describing and contextualizing the #MeToo movement and highlighting trends and developments in the gender composition of legislatures
and public company boards before making observations about the potential gender effects of the #MeToo movement on public company
board composition. These observations include both short-term and
long-term potentialities regarding the election of women to, and the
service of women on, corporate boards. A summary conclusion is offered to provide closure.
I. THE #METOO MOVEMENT
The #MeToo movement likely needs little introduction for the
presumed readers of this Essay. The basic background facts are relatively simple and clear. In response to increasing public revelations of
sexual harassment and assault among women across professional
spheres—initially and perhaps most famously among women working
in the entertainment and media industries13—a grassroots coalition
developed to focus on encouraging public discourse and political, so-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3536085
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11 See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity
in Corporate Governance, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 105, 140 (2018) (“Overall, the evidence regarding
female board representation and firm performance has strengthened over recent years, but any
direct relationship remains ambiguous.”); Darren Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversity on
Boards Benefit Firms?, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 429, 484 (2017) (noting and assessing various potential values of gender diversity on corporate boards of directors and urging “contextually accurate
work” in the area); Mildred Woryk, Women in Corporate Governance: A Cinderella Story, 37 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 21, 25 (2011) (“Despite many researchers’ attempts to make the business case
for female representation on boards, results are inconclusive.”).
12 See generally Heminway, Women in the Crowd, supra note 10 (exploring possible benefits of gender diversity, among other things, in board decisionmaking); Rosenblum, supra note 11
(same).
13 See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Feminist Judgments & #MeToo, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. ONLINE 51, 51–52 (2018) (offering the public revelations of Matt Lauer and Garrison Keillor as exemplars of the early public narratives in the #MeToo movement); Angela OnwuachiWillig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Movement, 128 YALE L.J.F.
105, 106 (2018) (averring that “the #MeToo movement exploded onto the popular media stage”
after a 2017 tweet posted by actress Alyssa Milano); Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, Time’s Up,
and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 47 (“Allegations against movie mogul Harvey
Weinstein and the ensuing #MeToo movement opened the floodgates to a modern-day reckoning with sexist behavior.”); Chicago Tribune, supra note 8 (crediting actress Ashley Judd’s accusations about sexual transgression involving media mogul Harvey Weinstein as a catalyst of the
#MeToo movement); Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, The #MeToo Moment: Blue-Collar Women
Ask, ‘What About Us?,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/themetoo-moment-blue-collar-women-ask-what-about-us.html [https://perma.cc/GTT2-BV2K];
David Gelles, Wall Street Has Been Unscathed by MeToo. Until Now., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
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cial, and economic responses.14 Although this movement has attracted
significant public attention,15 it is yet to be adopted by a political elite
and converted into a populist uprising.16 Politicians—especially from
the Democratic party—have embraced #MeToo and used it—and continue to use it—in political campaigns;17 yet, #MeToo has not yet been
fully embraced by political actors who are empowered to control the
social agenda for the masses.18
The phrase “Me Too” used in this context has deeper, more longstanding roots.19 Coined in 2006 by activist and changemaker Tarana
Burke, Me Too originally focused on supporting the needs of sexual
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2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/16/business/metoo-wall-street-tcw-tirschwell-ravich.html
[https://perma.cc/R3RC-JMGX].
14 See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Mr. Trump’s Contribution to Women’s Human Rights, 24 ILSA
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 329 (2018) (noting several social responses); Wexler et al., supra note
13, at 52–53 (detailing a variety of employment-related responses).
The combination of #MeToo’s shift to the outing of specific wrongdoers, investigative journalism, and enhanced public scrutiny has led to the firing, suspension, or
resignation of high-level and high-profile individuals across industries, including
government and politics, acting and producing, comedy, media, food, music, photography, and venture capital. Even a few individuals in fields with extensive workplace protections such as academia and the judiciary have been brought low.
Wexler et al., supra note 13, at 52–53.
15 E.g., Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 13, at 106 (“Combined, more than 12 million users of
Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat, and other social media platforms offered posts and reactions to
Milano’s #MeToo challenge.”); Dalvin Brown, 19 Million Tweets Later: A Look at #MeToo a
Year After the Hashtag Went Viral, USA TODAY (Oct. 13, 2018, 10:12 PM), https://www.usa
today.com/story/news/2018/10/13/metoo-impact-hashtag-made-online/1633570002/ [https://
perma.cc/6S5C-EGD6].
16 Populist uprisings may be distinguished from movements. Specifically, “[a]lthough both
forms of popular subjectivity contest established elites, social movements mobilize such contestation from the bottom-up, whereas populism typically mobilizes mass constituencies from the
top-down behind the leadership of a counter-elite.” Kenneth M. Roberts, Populism, Social
Movements, and Popular Subjectivity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 682
(Donatella Della Porta & Mario Diani eds., 2015).
17 See Alex Daugherty, A Miami Congressional Candidate Shares Her #Metoo Moment,
Miami Herald (Nov. 29, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article187076533.html [https://perma.cc/22UN-TH22]; Jane C. Timm, In #MeToo Era, Women Are Campaigning with Personal Stories of Sexual Abuse and Harassment, NBC News (July
8, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/metoo-era-women-arecampaigning-personal-stories-sexual-abuse-harassment-n889416 [https://perma.cc/E4WL-3VR3].
18 See id. at 681–82 (“[P]opulism typically involves an appropriation of popular subjectivity by dominant personalities who control the channels, rhythms, and organizational forms of
social mobilization.”). One academic commentator notes that “while the #MeToo movement has
harnessed the power and potential of social media and public opinion, it lacks the market power
and capital that . . . corporations were able to bring to bear on the issue of LGBTQ equality.”
Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 874 (2019).
19 See, e.g., Wexler et. al., supra note 13, at 52 (“The seeming apoliticism of #MeToo collided almost immediately with activist Tarana Burke’s pre-existing ‘Me Too’ social movement
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violence survivors. From the outset, Me Too’s “vision . . . was to address both the dearth in resources for survivors of sexual violence and
to build a community of advocates, driven by survivors, who will be at
the forefront of creating solutions to interrupt sexual violence in their
communities.”20 Many credit Burke and her work in founding the current #MeToo movement.21
The #MeToo movement is part of a larger effort to change norms
around women, workplaces, and the distribution of authority, discretion, and accountability. Also notable in this regard is “the related
#TimesUp movement, which seeks to create awareness not only of
sexual harassment but just as significantly on gender equity, parity and
pay in every industry.”22 For many, the two movements—#MeToo and
#TimesUp—constitute key distinct components of a greater societal
awareness of and concern about issues at the intersection of gender
and established power structures, including political and business
management and leadership.
II. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GENDER COMPOSITION
OF LEGISLATURES AND PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS
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which focuses on women of color and people in marginalized communities and uses self-identification as a way to build bridges among survivors.”).
20 History & Vision, supra note 8.
21 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 18, at 875 n.227 (citing to Burke as founder of the #MeToo
movement); Len Niehoff, “Catch and Kill”: Does the First Amendment Protect Buying Speech to
Bury It?, 34 COMM. LAW. 4, 4 n.7 (2019) (“The #MeToo movement is generally understood to
have begun in 2006 when Tarana Burke coined the phrase in an effort to help women and girls of
color who, like her, were survivors of sexual assault.”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 13, at
106–07 (noting the recognition of Burke’s work in response to Alyssa Milano’s tweet).
22 Alka Patel, Women in the Law Division: Let’s Make 2018 a Year to End Workplace
Inequality, 20 LAW. J. 3 (2018).
23 The Data on Women Leaders, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 13, 2018), http://www.pewsocial
trends.org/fact-sheet/the-data-on-women-leaders/ [https://perma.cc/8HFJ-E6GL].
24 Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Women and Leadership 2018, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept.
20, 2018), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/09/20/women-and-leadership-2018/ [https://
perma.cc/37A5-5MKT].
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Women, historically omitted from political and corporate governance bodies, have made significant incursions into federal and state
legislatures, among other political roles, and into corporate boardrooms and C-suites. The Pew Research Center devotes an entire
webpage to data on female leaders that textually and visually captures
and conveys the nature and extent of these and other changes in female governance in the United States.23 A September 2018 report offers related information and observations.24
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See The Data on Women Leaders, supra note 23.
See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id.; see also Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, https://
www.house.gov/representatives [https://perma.cc/R253-N8UE] (“Currently, there are five delegates representing the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. A resident commissioner represents Puerto
Rico.”).
33 See The Data on Women Leaders, supra note 23.
34 CATALYST, supra note 3, at 1.
35 See id.
36 See The Data on Women Leaders, supra note 23.
37 See id.
25
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Female representation in the U.S. Congress is at an all-time
high.25 Both houses gained women in the 2018 midterm elections.26
Overall trends in female participation in the Senate and the House of
Representatives have been upward for more than 40 years.27
Twenty-five women—seventeen Democrats and eight Republicans—currently serve in the U.S. Senate, constituting 25% of this legislative body.28 In 1965, the earliest year for which the Pew Research
Center reports data, a mere two percent of U.S. Senators were women.29 In 1993, after the “Year of the Woman,” women constituted six
percent of the U.S. Senate.30
The House of Representatives currently includes 102 women as
voting members—89 Democrats and 13 Republicans—constituting
23.4% of its total membership.31 Four women, representing American
Samoa, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, serve as nonvoting participants.32 By contrast—but trending
in parallel with U.S. Senate representation—2.3% of House members
were women in 1965 and 10.8% were women in 1993.33
Female representation on corporate boards of directors has similarly increased in a relatively slow and steady fashion. In 1993, Catalyst reported that 500 women served on Fortune 500/Service 500
boards, up from 46 women on top U.S. corporate boards in 1977.34
Nevertheless, women occupied only 721 or 6.2% of the seats on those
boards of directors in 1993.35 In 1995, 9.6% of the members of Fortune
500 boards of directors were women.36 That number climbed to 22.2%
in 2017.37
In and after the “Year of the Woman” and during the pendency
of the #MeToo movement, female members of Congress and female
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corporate board members increased at a somewhat greater rate than
the norm. Specifically, documented increases in female senators—four
percent from 1991 to 1993, three percent from 1993 to 1995, and four
percent from 2017 to 2019—and House members—4.4% from 1991 to
1993 and 4.3% from 2017 to 2019—exceed more typical election-overelection percentage increases between 1965 and 2019.38 By way of
contrast, for example, between 1965 and 1991, the number of female
House members did not increase more than 0.7% between two consecutive election cycles—and decreased on a few occasions.39 Similarly, recorded increases in the percentage of female directors
following the “Year of the Woman”—approximately 3.4% from 1993
to 1995—and during the rise of the recent #MeToo movement—two
percent from 2016 to 2017—are somewhat higher than the norm, with
more typical increases being plus-or-minus one percent per year.40
In a bold, original move that may (or may not) be trendsetting in
the United States,41 California enacted legislation in 2018 that compels
each corporation with a California principal executive office—regardless of its state of incorporation—to have at least one female director
on its board of directors by the end of 2019.42 By the end of 2021, a
corporation having principal executive offices in California and a
board of directors comprising five or more members must appoint two
female directors.43 A corporation having principal executive offices in
California and a board of directors comprising six or more members
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See id.
See id.
40 See id.; CATALYST, supra note 3, at 1.
41 See Felix von Meyerinck et al., As California Goes, So Goes the Nation? 3–4 (Feb. 22,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303798 [https://perma.cc/7736AGAB] (“In recent years, California has frequently been the first state to enact progressive
legislation that was later adopted by other states in the U.S. as well. . . . It is reasonable to
assume that California’s actions on a mandatory gender quota may increase the likelihood that
certain other states will follow.”). Indeed, some additional states have introduced new legislative
measures designed to increase the gender diversity of corporate boards. See, e.g., Joan Helwig,
More States Promote Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, COGENCY GLOBAL (June 2, 2019),
https://www.cogencyglobal.com/blog/more-states-promote-gender-diversity-on-corporateboards; Laura Weiss, California Board Diversity Mandate Spreads to Other States, Washington,
ROLL CALL, https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/california-board-diversity-mandate-spreadsstates-washington (July 19, 2019, 5:31 PM). Illinois enacted a disclosure-based law in 2019. 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/8.12, 5/14.05(l) (2019).
42 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (2019) (“No later than the close of the 2019 calendar year,
a publicly held domestic or foreign corporation whose principal executive offices, according to
the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in California shall have a minimum of one female
director on its board.”); see id. § 301.3(b)(3) (“If its number of directors is four or fewer, the
corporation shall have a minimum of one female director.”).
43 See id. § 301.3(b)(2).
38
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must appoint three female directors.44 This legislation follows earlier
nonbinding resolutions adopted by legislatures in California and a
number of other states.45
III.

OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL GENDER EFFECTS
OF THE #METOO MOVEMENT ON PUBLIC COMPANY
BOARD COMPOSITION

It seems apparent from the 2018 congressional election cycle and
California’s striking legislation fostering female board inclusion that
there currently is a renewed attention on gender participation in governance—both political and corporate. This gender inclusion focus
follows closely on the rise of the #MeToo movement. Whether the
#MeToo movement is a direct, indirect, or contributing cause of these
recent occurrences may be in the eye of the beholder, but some academic commentators have begun to make claims in this regard.46 Two
posit a seemingly broad and inclusive effect of #MeToo on political
and corporate governance. These academics note that “[t]he #MeToo
Movement . . . resonates with both politicians and business. The
movement has strong support in Congress, in state legislatures, and in
the business community.”47
Scholars observe or assume political ramifications of the #MeToo
movement.48 However, there has been especial interest in the connection between the #MeToo movement and corporate governance. A
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See id. § 301.3(b)(1).
See Darren Rosenblum, California Dreaming?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1456 (2019) (noting “California’s 2013 voluntary quota”); von Meyerinck et al., supra note 41, at 6.
46 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Sex, Trump, and Constitutional
Change, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 45 (2019) (“[W]omen have mobilized about sexual harassment
through the social media campaign called #MeToo, and companies and government offices have
felt compelled to clean house.”). Professor Darren Rosenblum draws a causal connection with
respect to the California board quota initiative when he states that “California, when confronted
with the shocking sex inequality in Hollywood and Silicon Valley exposed by the #MeToo movement, followed the transnational corporate board quota movement by converting its voluntary
quota into a hard quota.” Rosenblum, supra note 45, at 1437.
47 Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Epic Backslide: The Supreme Court
Endorses Mandatory Individual Arbitration Agreements, #TimesUp on Workers’ Rights, 15 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 41, 81 (2019); see also id. at 82–83 (“The #MeToo Movement, however, resonates
with both politicians and business. The movement has strong support in Congress, in state legislatures, and in the business community.”).
48 See, e.g., Jamie R. Abrams, The #MeToo Movement: An Invitation for Feminist Critique
of Rape Crisis Framing, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 749, 767 (2018) (“#MeToo seems to be quite a
political turning point and a decisive moment of upheaval.”); Nancy Chi Cantalupo & William C.
Kidder, Systematic Prevention of a Serial Problem: Sexual Harassment and Bridging Core Concepts of Bakke in the #MeToo Era, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2349, 2382 (2019) (noting “recent
political and social shifts associated with the #MeToo movement”).
44
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pair of academic commentators asserts that, in light of the #MeToo
and #TimesUp movements and the activism they promote, “boards
and companies need to change their thinking and actions around diversity and equal treatment.”49 Another researcher observes, along
similar lines, that:
[S]hareholder tastes for diversity may not be the most important factor in motivating business leaders to pursue diversity
and anti-discrimination efforts. . . . Business leaders must
consider their firms’ reputations and potential public outrage
in reaction to misconduct at their firms. This is an important
lesson that is illustrated by the expression of public outrage
to workplace sexual harassment and abuse that ignited the
#MeToo and #TimesUp movements.50
The news media and other pundits, as well as primary actors in this
reality play, also have linked the #MeToo movement to recent political and corporate governance changes.51
Notwithstanding the corporate governance buzz created by the
#MeToo movement, it is hard to imagine that other states will follow
California’s lead and adopt statutes that mandatorily diversify corporate boards of directors. California is often seen to be more progressive on social and environmental issues,52 and quotas are not broadly
favored in American lawmaking on diversity and inclusion.53 But a
Dworkin & Schipani, supra note 11, at 127.
Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Compliance that Advances Racial Diversity and Justice and
Why Business Deregulation Does Not Matter, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 611, 634–35 (2018).
51 See, e.g., Emily Shugerman, The #MeToo Movement Takes Office After Winning Elections Across the U.S., DAILY BEAST (Nov. 7, 2018, 10:52 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/
the-metoo-movement-takes-office-after-winning-elections-across-the-us [https://perma.cc/N4J3KD7Q] (“For more than a year now, the #MeToo movement has been a cultural force, spurring
thousands of women to share their experiences of sexual abuse and ousting hundreds of alleged
abusers from positions of power. Now, that force has a vote.”); Elizabeth C. Tippett, How the
‘Wave of Women’ Entering Congress Could Turn the #MeToo Movement into Concrete Action,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 17, 2018, 9:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/women-entering-congress-could-turn-the-metoo-movement-into-action-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/EZ29-7LHB] (“The
2018 midterm elections represented the first electoral referendum of the #MeToo era.”).
52 See, e.g., Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and
Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 119 n.217 (2015)
(referring to “an arguably progressive California legislature”); Jon H. Sylvester, How California
Governs the News Media, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 381, 381 (1986) (noting that “California
legislation is generally regarded as progressive”); Alex Lemberg, Comment, Hackers Made Me
Lose My Job!: Health Data Privacy and Its Potentially Devastating Effect on the LGBTQ Population, 47 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 175, 183 (2017) (noting that “California . . . has a history of
leadership in passing progressive legislation” and citing laws governing transgender bathroom
usage and public education).
53 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 38, 40 (2014) (“[G]ender quotas may seem a
49
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continued and strengthened attention to the inclusion of women on
corporate boards may occur, nevertheless. The #MeToo movement
may be causing and interacting with both changes in political governance and other factors in ways that contribute to—and may have the
capacity to sustain—significant interest in securing a greater presence
for women on corporate boards.
Now, unlike in 1992’s “Year of the Woman,” there is a greater
sense that women’s issues are not merely political issues, but also business issues. In 1993, Catalyst found that women on corporate boards
were hesitant to bring women’s issues forward in the boardroom for
fear of being marginalized.54 Accordingly, in its report, it exhorted
board leadership to action, recommending that “[c]orporate board
chairmen who recognize women as an important business resource . . .
must . . . communicate to male board members that addressing such
issues is a legitimate and necessary role for the corporate board.”55
The #MeToo movement has clearly exposed women’s issues as both
political and business issues. The very fact that sexual misconduct of
the kind laid bare by the #MeToo movement more specifically implicates power dynamics prevalent in politics and business makes this a
reality.
Movements like #MeToo can foster change. But questions arise
as to the lasting nature of that change.56 The power of movements to
make change may diminish as time passes. It has been observed that
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cultural and legal oddity in the United States; a European transplant unlikely to take root
here.”); id. (“[E]ven if a quota could survive constitutional scrutiny, gender quotas for corporate
boards seem to represent the kind of intrusive state regulation of business that our nation’s
laissez faire ideology seems to reject.”); Angela R. Foster, A Quest to Increase Women in Corporate Board Leadership: Comparing the Law in Norway and the U.S., 26 WASH. INT’L L.J. 381, 381
(2017) (averring that gender quotas on board of directors are “highly unlikely in the United
States”); id. at 412 (“[A] quota law is not a palatable solution in the U.S.”); Yaron Nili, Beyond
the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145, 193–94 (2019) (“As
a practical matter, quotas are an unlikely regulatory avenue in the United States, as they would
face legal hurdles and are unlikely to garner investor or regulatory support.” (footnotes omitted)); Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1186 (2006) (“In the United States,
quotas are widely condemned, and gender and racial discrimination law operate in orthogonal
dimensions.”); Debbie A. Thomas, Bias in the Boardroom: Implicit Bias in the Selection and
Treatment of Women Directors, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 539, 545 (2018) (noting in the corporate
board context that “[u]nlike other countries whose regulatory approaches employ quotas or the
stronger ‘comply or explain’ disclosure approach, U.S. law imposes no affirmative obligation to
consider diversity, and only requires disclosing whether or not the company considers it”).
54 CATALYST, supra note 3, at 58.
55 Id.
56 See Wexler et al., supra note 13, at 53 (“[M]any worry that #MeToo’s victories will be
short-lived in the absence of deeper structural and cultural changes.”).
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the effects of parallel movements in other countries have dissipated
over time.57
The Pew Research Center reports, based on survey data obtained
in July 2018, that 59% of adults believe there are too few women in
both high political offices and in top executive business positions.58
Moreover, close to a majority of adults surveyed (49%) believes that
discrimination is a major reason why there are not more women in
high political offices, and a majority (54%) believes that discrimination is a major reason why women do not occupy more top executive
business positions.59 If action follows from thoughts and words, this
data superficially suggests that increases in female participation in
these roles may continue, although the authors of the report note an
important political divide.
Both “Republicans and Democrats have widely different views
about where things stand today and what factors are holding women
back.”60 Yet, the views of Republicans and Democrats differ in key
areas. For example, “Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more than twice as likely as Republicans and those who lean
Republican to say there are too few women in high political offices
(79% vs. 33%).”61 Republicans and Democrats also disagree on the
role that gender discrimination plays in political underrepresentation.
Democrats believe in far greater numbers that gender discrimination
is the major reason for political underrepresentation.62 These differences, together with similar political party differences revealed by parallel data on the reasons for female underrepresentation in top
executive business positions,63 signal that the traction of one political
party or another may determine whether sustained gains, if any, are
achieved in the numbers and percentages of women on corporate
boards.
Overall, signals from the Pew Research Center report are quite
mixed when it comes to an assessment of the sustainability of in57 See Somini Sengupta, The #MeToo Moment: What Happened After Women Broke the
Silence Elsewhere?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/themetoo-moment-what-happened-after-women-broke-the-silence-elsewhere.html [https://
perma.cc/NG5S-N3WB].
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See id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See id. (“[W]hile 64% of Democrats say gender discrimination is a major reason why
women are underrepresented in these positions, only 30% of Republicans agree.”).
63 See id.
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Id.
66 See id.
67 Cf. Seletha R. Butler, All on Board! Strategies for Constructing Diverse Boards of Directors, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 61, 80 (2012) (“The entrenched beliefs of individuals often function to
prohibit or slow diversity advancements.”).
68 Nili, supra note 53, at 202 (“[I]nvestors and regulators must turn their attention beyond
the numbers to the systematic disparities between women and men on boards. If women are not
moving into positions of power on boards or are otherwise treated differently on boards, we
need to know why, and we need to understand the cost.”).
69 Thomas, supra note 53, at 541.
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creased female participation in leadership, including business leadership and more particularly, board representation. For example, the
report notes that “[d]espite the surge of female candidates this year,
women are increasingly doubtful that voters are ready to elect more
female leaders.”64 Yet, the authors also note that “[m]ajorities say
having more women in top positions in business and government
would improve the quality of life at least somewhat for all Americans
(69%) and for women (77%) and men (57%) specifically.”65 Major
distinctions across data categories hold based on political party, gender, and age differences.66
This may mean that sustainable changes in the gender composition of boards of directors will depend on who is nominating or voting
to elect corporate directors. In a corporation, existing directors typically nominate directors for election or re-election by shareholders—
acting as a committee, often with input from the chief executive officer of the corporation—and, as permitted, may appoint directors to
vacancies when they occur between elections. The political and gender
composition of those nominating, voting, and appointing individuals
to directorships may significantly impact the gender composition of
boards.67 Professor Yaron Nili advocates looking beyond numbers to
board process in diversifying boards of directors.68 The observations
made here support that approach. The inclusion or different treatment
of women, Republicans, or Democrats on boards of directors or nominating committees of boards of directors, for example, may contribute
to or detract from board diversity. Moreover, a recent article suggests
more generally that “[i]mplicit gender bias affects both the director
nomination process and the challenges women directors face in the
boardroom.”69 Hypotheses based on observations made here may
help identify markers or sources of implicit biases. Much research remains to be done in this area.
Change often does not—and sometimes should not—wait, however, for researchers to fully explore every aspect of a given construct.
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Economic, social, and political forces can supervene or function in
parallel with research processes. Change momentum, however shortlived or limited, has been generated around corporate boards of directors coincident with change momentum in Congress. The source of the
change momentum may be unclear. But its existence is discernable.
Widespread public disclosures and perceptions of gender discrimination and repression correlate with overall increased percentages of
women in the boardroom. It has been observed that “policy change is
typically enacted in the aftermath of crises.”70 California’s gender
quota legislation, which prompted near immediate changes in the diversity of the boards of directors of firms regulated under the law,71
may be seen in this light. Whether that initiative or any other interventions designed in the wake of—and perhaps to capitalize on—the
#MeToo movement can result in sustained and sustainable change is
unclear. Assuming, as I do here, the value of increased gender diversity on public company boards of directors, it would be unfortunate,
however, if increases in female representation on public company
boards of directors can only be obtained after appreciable social suffering, especially if those increases may not be sustainable over time.
CONCLUSION
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70 Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 115 (2009).
71 See von Meyerinck et al., supra note 41, at 41 (“California-headquartered firms that
require one (two) female directors to comply with the quota on average increased female board
representation by 0.58 (0.69) percentage points relative to the control firms three months after
the quota introduction.”).
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While the efficacious exercise of political governance authority
and corporate governance authority undoubtedly are directed to the
achievement of different outcomes, serve different interests, and require different skill sets, the gender composition of key political and
corporate governance bodies—Congress and public company boards
of directors—reflect certain similarities over time. These similarities
provoke thought about, among other things, the pace of change in the
gender mix of these important governance institutions. Change has
generally been slow, as it often is when entrenched historical power
centers threaten to shift.
Yet, both the events creating 1992’s “Year of the Woman” and
the similar catalysts of the 2018 midterm congressional election results
capture parallel political and corporate moments for gender diversity
and inclusion. Those events and catalysts represent significant social
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forces that drive change and would benefit from further study. To the
extent that positive social forces can be harnessed and their effects
prolonged—perhaps through legislation, regulation, or other mechanisms designed to encourage and support more lasting changes in social norms related to gender diversity and inclusion—significant,
sustained increases in the gender diversity of public company corporate boards of directors may be possible.
In this regard, California’s gender quota legislation adds an interesting option to the mix of available alternatives. While the overall
effects of the statute remain to be seen, early compliance and the
prospect—however improbable—of a proliferation of statutes of this
kind offer a hope that faster, greater gender diversification may be
possible in coming years. Regardless, it seems probable that nonlegislative alternatives to capitalize on what the #MeToo movement has
catalyzed will continue to be dominant avenues for long-term change.
Changing board processes to better engage diverse directors in core
corporate governance—including those involved in director nominations and appointments—and address implicit biases may hold special
promise in this regard.
In parallel with these possible changes at the firm level, research
on the substantive aspects of board diversity can and should continue.
The more we can learn about the barriers to board diversity and the
causal roots of those barriers, the more creative and targeted our responses can become. Additional and more consistent benefits of gender diversification then should be realizable and more identifiable.
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